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Chapter 1
Sketching Out a Blueprint of 
Networked Disinformation:
A Production Studies Approach
Several days before the November 2016 US elections, Buzzfeed broke a story about university students 
in the town of Veles, Macedonia operating a hub of impostor news sites circulating sensationalist 
or false content as clickbait to supporters of Donald Trump.2 Unlike other forms of fake news and 
propaganda that were ideologically invested in national policy issues such as Brexit in the UK,3 or an 
illiberal agenda to disrupt national democratic systems, such as Russian government intervention in 
the US elections,4 the Macedonian case was reported to be driven by a naive, if misguided, youthful 
entrepreneurship. As Wired magazine put it, 
“These Macedonians on Facebook didn’t care if Trump won or lost the White House. They only 
wanted pocket money to pay for things—a car, watches, better cell phones, more drinks at the 
EDU7KLVLVWKHDUUK\WKPLFGLVWXUELQJKHDUWRIWKHDƛIDLUWKDWWKHLQWHUQHWPDGHLWVRVLPSOH
IRUWKHVH\RXQJPHQWRƛLQDQFHWKHLUPDWHULDOZKLPVDQGWKDWWKHLUDFWLRQVKHOSHGGHOLYHUVXFK
momentous consequences”. 5
The news coverage and analysis of the Macedonian fake news factory, along with related news of a 
Singaporean teenager who was hired to do political micro-work for the Trump campaign out of a 
digital work platform,6 were inspired our exploratory search for similar workers producing digital 
disinformation in the Philippines—either for political clients internally or overseas. Funded by a British 
Council Newton Fund grant, those of us in the Newton Tech4Dev Network7 who were investigating 
so-called “digital sweatshops” in the Philippines grew curious about the labor conditions and social 
identities of digital workers involved in disinformation production. We considered comparing the 
2 Silverman and Alexander 2016.
3 Grice 2017.
4 Burgess 2017.
5 Subramanian 2017.
6 Ming 2016.
7 One research stream of the Newton Tech4Dev Network explores the conditions of digital workers in the Philippines. Surpassing India as the call 
center hub of the world, it occupies a coveted position in the global economy of outsourcing. Also known as the “social media capital” of the world, 
the Philippines has a highly connected and available digital workforce, many of whom also get digital gig work from online portals. Both state and 
industry are invested in promoting the benefits of digital work, even referring to such workers as “new national heroes” (bagong bayani). See David 
2015 and www.newtontechfordev.com. 
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conditions of highly stressful and always-on labor arrangements of data entry specialists and social 
media content moderators with authors of fake news and political “troll armies”. After all, provocative 
commentary by digital media and information studies scholars such as Antonio Casilli8 and Sarah 
Roberts9 have suggested that beyond the social media infrastructures that have distorted democratic 
exchange by perniciously clustering online communities into filter bubbles, research should also 
consider the consequences of invisible digital labor arrangements to democratic processes, nationally 
and transnationally.10 
Crucially within the Philippine public sphere, mainstream media, policymakers, and the Catholic 
Church bemoan the toxic incivility and proliferation of disinformation in online political discourse in 
the run-up to the May 2016 Philippine elections. Populist leader Rodrigo Duterte’s victory is credited 
in large part to a groundswell of grassroots support that was amplified by and visualized in social 
media. Many of Duterte’s critics attribute heightened “indecency” in political discourse to his legion of 
supporters, often described and generalized as “trolls” and “cyber pests”11 motivated by “blind loyalty”12 
to Duterte and emboldened by his use of “gutter language”.13 These critics use the label “Dutertard”14 
interchangeably with “troll” to shame these  supporters, thus creating a rhetorical cycle of hateful 
confrontation across political camps. 
Duterte’s critics are right to point out the increased vitriol  in online political discussions among 
Filipinos. What this moral panic often ignores, however, is the very real discontent that Duterte’s 
supporters are expressing. Their angry tone is a resounding rejection of the “politics of decency” that 
they associate with the oligarchic elite political establishment, which they feel has not brought about 
any palpable change in their everyday lives.15 It is also the product of a negotiation between “the 
politics of anxiety and the politics of hope”,16 as it instantiates their desire for “a game-changer who 
would finally recognize and act on their concerns”.17 It is in this light that one might better understand 
the toxic incivility of political discussion in the Philippines today, which is clearly a marked departure 
for Filipino social media where interactions have previously conformed with middle-class norms of 
respectability18 and cultural norms of circumspection and reciprocity.19  
12
8 Casilli 2016.
9 Roberts 2016.
10 Casilli 2016.
11 Yang 2016.
12 Palatino 2017.
13 Rosario 2016.
14 An offensive play of words: Duterte and retard.
15 Many of the vocal Duterte supporters on social media come from the precarious middle class or the aspiring working class. Amongst them, many 
are disappointed because of the perceived failure of the preceding Aquino administration to fulfill its campaign promise of lifting Filipinos out of 
poverty by espousing a “politics of decency” premised on taking the “Daang Matuwid” (or Righteous Path) (see Heydarian, 2018). Despite the effective 
anti-corruption initiatives and stellar economic growth credited to the Aquino government, the middle class continued to “suffer from the high cost 
of living, poor delivery of basic services, and the everyday struggle of to stay safe and secure within their homes and properties” (Deinla, 2017).
16 Curato 2016.
17 Cabañes and Cornelio 2017.
18 Cabañes and Ong 2011.
19 Madianou and Miller 2012; McKay 2016.
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While liberal elite circles simplistically label Duterte supporters as brainwashed or uneducated lower-
class mobs (an assumption misleadingly reproduced in global media coverage of “exotic” Philippine 
politics), several scholars such as Nicole Curato and Cleve Arguelles provide a more nuanced but 
equally critical view of Duterte’s populist appeal. Rather than perceiving Duterte supporters as 
“fanatics”, Arguelles argues that populist publics view Duterte’s “political performance” as “giv[ing] 
voice to the miserable, bring[ing] authenticity to politics, and reflect[ing] persistent political will”.20 
Curato thoughtfully suggests that while Duterte’s “penal populism” may indeed give voice to citizen’s 
fears and demands, it should not discount the fact that it also “silences ‘the dangerous other’” who 
are viewed as “enemies that should be eradicated”.21 This us-versus-them narrative is one feature 
that characterizes “populist political style”22 as seen in the way Duterte and social media influencers 
discredit and silence dissent, and foster a culture of impunity, implicitly encouraging their grassroots 
supporters to digitally bully and “troll” journalists and the publications they work and perceive to be 
critical of the current administration. 
As seen in similar incidents in Russia,23 journalistic trolling extends beyond just negative speech and 
vitriol on comments sections of news sites, but goes as far as death threats and deployment of state 
agency apparatus—investigative bodies that arbitrarily harass and silence publications for various 
“business violations”.24 Journalists are “under pressure” with the President’s pronouncements against 
them.25 The stifling and silencing of the press is especially alarming when experienced in light of the 
broader culture of impunity under Duterte’s regime, where the war on drugs has killed an estimate of 
3,933 and four journalist killings recorded since he took office.26 These figures suggest that political 
trolling in the Philippines is not confined to verbal abuse but can escalate to physical or even mortal 
harm.
Mainstream media coverage and civil society efforts to address disinformation focus on the “state-
sponsored” or “patriotic” trolling that is said to be organized by the administration. Proposed solutions, 
such as the creation of watchdogs and intersectoral alliances that could defend against disinformation, 
are few. The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) issued a pastoral letter calling 
out fake news as being against “human intellect of the truth” and a “sin against charity”.27 They 
condemned fake news purveyors by releasing a list of 29 websites that allegedly contain “fake or 
20 Arguelles 2017, ii.
21 Curato 2016, 106.
22 Moffit and Tormey 2014.
23 Moffit and Tormey 2014.
24 Press alliances and civil society organizations have urged the government to address journalist killings. However, the President is perceived to 
sending “wrong signals” when he had commented in a press conference that journalists are killed “because they are corrupt”. The Southeast Asian 
Press Alliance expressed they were “deeply disturbed” with the President’s statement and stated that his statement is  “irresponsible and dangerous as 
these send the wrong signal about the work of journalists”. See SEAPA 2016.
25 Press alliances and civil society organizations have urged the government to address journalist killings. However, the President is perceived to 
sending “wrong signals” when he had commented in a press conference that journalists are killed “because they are corrupt”. The Southeast Asian 
Press Alliance expressed they were “deeply disturbed” with the President’s statement and stated that his statement is  “irresponsible and dangerous as 
these send the wrong signal about the work of journalists”. See SEAPA 2016.
26 The figures are from the Philippine National Police Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management, see published news report by 
Talabong 2017.
27 Villegas 2017. 13
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unverified content”.28 Other journalists have also advocated lobbying Facebook to take responsibility 
in taking down offensive speech and censoring accounts perceived to engage in state-sponsored 
trolling.29 
However, we argue that Philippine media and civil society’s response, by selectively blacklisting 
pages or people while excluding or even hero-worshipping others that share similarly anonymous 
and hyperpartisan content, is incomplete and misleading.30 We echo the caution that US scholars 
Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan express toward emerging fact-checking mechanisms, when 
they say that such methods “can quickly backfire when people question the authority of those who 
create the labels… An organization labelling something as ‘fake’ should provide full transparency 
around how it makes its ‘blacklists’”.31 While such proposals may mean well, they may end up further 
polarizing political camps if criteria for labeling are mystified, sanctimoniously adjudicated, and/
or fail to be inclusive of perspectives from diverse stakeholders. This report further argues that 
efforts at fact-checking and blacklisting while well-meaning do not address the underlying causes 
of disinformation by failing to address the professionalized and institutionalized work structures 
and financial incentives that normalize and reward “paid troll” work.
Our report aims to understand the impact of how various disinformation campaigns collectively 
create a public sphere filled with information pollution and, consequently, with toxic incivility and 
polarization. We look at state-sponsored trolling and how the deployment of click armies contributes 
to political silencing and even the consolidation of revisionist historical narratives that can have long-
term consequences to political processes and future elections. At the same time, we also take into 
account trolling from other political quarters and how these equally contribute to the prevailing 
information disorder. In Chapter 4, we pay specific attention to disinformation architects’ use of 
the populist political style in deploying disinformation techniques that open up spaces of grievance, 
reinforce political divisions, and fan the flames of discontent.
At the same time, our report aims to take a longer view of political deception. We argue that an 
inquiry into the work structure of digital disinformation reveals a professionalized and normalized 
hierarchy headed by disinformation architects who are culturally embedded in the promotional 
industries, and are dependent on the complicity of professional elites in advertising and PR as well as 
underpaid digital and creative workers.
28 Some of these websites are already included in the list that the National Union Journalist of the Philippines (NUJP) also flagged as fake news 
through a web plug-in called “Fakeblok” (see details here: https://fakeblok.com/). The tool marks Facebook posts which share content from the 
blacklisted sites.
29 Maria Ressa of online news platform Rappler is the lead proponent of such initiatives, see Etter 2017. Her pessimism about Facebook and its impact 
on democracy is shared by other mainstream media journalists such as Howie Severino of GMA Network.
30 For a nuanced critique of mainstream media’s selectiveness in their watchdog campaign against hyperpartisan pages in social media, we recommend 
reading Katrina Stuart-Santiago’s take on an incident where a once-anonymous blogger supporting the opposition party was conferred “hero” status 
by mainstream media outlets in spite of reproducing content that is similarly divisive and offensive. See Stuart-Santiago 2018.
31 Wardle and Derakhshan 2017, 64.
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Over the course of our exploratory work from December 2016 to December 2017, we have in fact 
failed to deliver evidence to the original question of outsourced “digital sweatshop” political work, 
which we started with. Where we succeeded was in uncovering the systematic work infrastructure 
behind the production of disinformation in local politics. We met high-level political strategists, digital 
influencers, and fake account operators who gave us insight into how each type of digital laborer fits 
into a networked disinformation architecture serving local political clients. 
Networked disinformation here refers to the organized production of political deception 
that distributes responsibilities to diverse and loosely interconnected groups of hierarchized 
digital workers.32 In our field site of Metro Manila, we met digital strategists who hold day jobs in 
advertising and public relations firms, doing corporate marketing for high-profile household brands. 
We met the anonymous digital influencers they work with: the online micro-celebrities who maintain 
humorous and compelling digital personas that attract between 50,000 and 2,000,000 followers. We 
also met lower-level workers who operate fake accounts on Facebook and Twitter, doing subcontracted 
piecemeal digital work while also doing more conventional office jobs.
When it comes to the production of disinformation, the digital sweatshop is diverse and temporal. 
Floating “trolling hackathons” or intense 24-hour periods of monitoring, producing and spreading 
content, and commenting across social media platforms to support and defend their candidate take place 
anywhere from  a politician’s office in their provincial bailiwick before a preplanned media event, or 
from a five-star hotel room booked by the lead strategist. The latter provides an aspirational backdrop 
that entices financially driven digital workers and fosters the right “team spirit” to carry on with what 
is seen as shameful, stigmatized work.
This report aims to sketch out a blueprint of the architecture of networked disinformation in the 
Philippines’ digital underground, based on twenty (20) in-depth interviews with people we call 
“architects of networked disinformation”. We supplement these interviews with participant 
observation of various digital campaigns on Facebook and Twitter, and insider access to fake accounts 
via passwords shared with us by our informants.
In sketching out this architecture and narrating ethnographic “portraits” of individual workers (made 
anonymous following ethics protocols), our aim is to invite discussion and debate. We call on other 
experts to fill in the missing pieces of the blueprint which are intentionally withheld or obscured by 
32 We find most useful Wardle & Derakshan’s definition of disinformation: “when false information is knowingly 
shared to cause harm.” They contrast this with misinformation (“when false information is shared, but no harm is 
meant”) and malinformation (“when genuine information is shared to cause harm, often by moving information 
designed to stay private into the public sphere”). See Wardle & Derakshan 2017, p. 5.
our informants, such as the financing or the traceability of digital campaigns (i.e., do digital campaign 
spends of politicians actually match their declared campaign contributions or income?). We invite 
other researchers to come forth and provide nuance to procedures and personalities we may judge 
harshly, but actually know little about. For example, how does the advertising and PR industry deal 
with the “open secrets” of corporate partners consulting for political clients? Where do they draw the 
line in subcontracting digital influencers to enhance the image of corporate brands? We invite legal 
experts to weigh in on the implications of our findings for reform in electoral campaign legislation, and 
ask technology experts and civil society to discuss their challenges in lobbying platform intermediaries 
such as Facebook and Google to engage with the socio-political context of the Philippines.
This project also grapples with the question facing both advanced liberal democracies and fragile 
states today: what exactly is the role that media and communications technologies play in the rise of 
global populism? This is a question that is often answered in highly media-centric and technologically 
deterministic ways. Previous research often overstate the significant effects of sublime new 
technologies, with little emphasis given to the social context, institutional forces, and deep histories 
of populist publics. For instance, an Oxford Internet Institute study on the use of bots in online 
political discourse in the US argued that they have a “fairly heavy handed role in amplifying political 
messages”,33 which they assume “make downstream contributions to a slew of political behaviours, 
including voting”.34 While this study helps us understand the use of automated software to rig 
trending rankings and direct conversation in a variety of international campaigns, we need empirical 
evidence that situates disinformation technologies within multiplatform campaign infrastructures 
undertaken in specific national contexts. As we illustrate in Chapters 3 and 4, disinformation in the 
Philippines is designed to spread across various “audience touch points”, and chief disinformation 
architects distort trending rankings by skillfully deploying creative workers to tap into populist public 
sentiment through weaponizing local popular vernaculars. 
We agree here with Paula Chakravartty and Srirupa Roy who identify a revival of “hypodermic 
needle” accounts of powerful media effects in recent media research on disinformation, where publics 
are assumed to be passive, gullible, and uninformed in the face of “fake news” while confined in their 
social media filter bubbles.35 Certainly, critical capacities to assess content and reject and negotiate 
meanings have been widely documented in studies of old and new media audiences,36 just as digital 
anthropology has powerfully argued that digital media practices make visible existing cultural norms 
rather than radically change user behaviors.37 
33 Woolley and Guilbeault 2017, 10.
34 Woolley and Guilbeault 2017, 13.
35 Chakravartty and Roy 2017, 4076.
36 Livingstone and Das 2013.
37 Miller 2011.
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In this study, we take up the challenge of Chakravartty and Roy to trace the historical antecedents 
of mediatized populism, thinking through how new social media affordances for political exchange 
map onto entrenched political systems, class hierarchies, and social dynamics in a developing country 
context with deep histories of populist sentiment. Thus we develop an account of the architecture of 
networked disinformation that is inherently social, discussing how architects of disinformation draw 
from institutional knowledge, professional skills, and interpersonal relationships when innovating 
techniques of political deception. Rather than psychologizing them or diagnosing the pathologies of 
populism, our primary aim here is to understand the social and cultural forces and institutions that 
make complicity and collusion with populist leaders easier. 
This approach requires empathy and an enlarged imagination rather than knee-jerk judgment. For 
this we turn to the valuable ethnographic work of understanding the sense-making processes of 
populist publics, such as Arlie Hochschild’s38 work with white working-class voters in Louisiana and 
Hillary Pilkington’s39 ethnography of members of the English Defense League in the UK. Their work 
invites us to dive into the complex rationalities and recognize the “deep stories” behind populist 
publics’ anger and resentment. 
We build on their work in two ways. First, we unpack the ways in which networked disinformation 
architects have strategically weaponized populist publics’ anger and resentment with the establishment, 
by taking tried-and-tested techniques in corporate marketing to the extreme in digital political 
campaigns. Second, we advance a comparative perspective to Euro-American literature on global 
populism through a specific inquiry to the Philippines case. We are inspired by the growing literature on 
populism in the Philippines, such as Nicole Curato’s illuminating writings about Duterte’s supporters 
in disaster-afflicted slums in central Philippines.40 Unlike the working-class Americans who feel left 
behind as “strangers in their own land”,41 the Filipino populist public feels as if they are finally finding a 
voice through new opportunities for speech in social media. We build on Curato’s work by expanding 
on her focus on the rationalities of “working class” or “lower class” Duterte supporters, and paying 
attention to the precarious middle class and professional elites who are complicit with an exploitative 
system for as long as they gain or maintain power for themselves. Here we assign moral culpability to 
these workers, particularly to the chief disinformation architects from the ad and PR industry, who 
personally benefit from this work arrangement while completely denying personal responsibility and 
evading professional and political accountability for the dangerous outcomes of their work.
38 Hochschild 2016.
39 Pilkington 2016.
40 Curato 2016.
41 Hochschild 2016.
In Chapter Two, we discuss the methodology of our research, narrate how we came into contact 
with disinformation architects, and state the questions that drove our interviews and participant 
observation. 
Chapter Three is the first data section and pertains to the work hierarchies of disinformation architects. 
Following a production studies approach, which aims to explore from the bottom-up workers’ 
“creativity within constraints” in media production processes,42 we aim to narrate ethnographic 
“portraits” of people we met to gain understanding of their complex social positionings and how their 
identities impact the content they produce. 
Chapter Four is the second main data section and discusses networked disinformation production and 
their social outcomes in online discussion and mobilization. This section builds on theoretical insight 
from political communication work that explains how digital campaigning engenders grassroots 
political participation.43 We break down the production process of networked disinformation 
campaigns, describing how disinformation architects act as crucial intermediaries of political 
marketing who aim to manipulate and mobilize populist sentiments to favor their political clients. 
This section also draws inspiration from media studies work on mediatized populism, which discusses 
how populist political style is expressed in online speech,44 and digital disinformation, which has 
previously discussed the formation of unholy alliances  among right-wing interest groups that aim to 
hijack mainstream media agenda through techniques of “attention-hacking”.45 We add to this line of 
work by paying attention to why disinformation architects in the Philippines turn to populist speech 
styles in weaponizing social media for political deception.
 
42 Mayer, Caldwell, and Banks 2009.
43 Penney 2017. 
44 Bulut and Yoruk 2017.
45 Marwick and Lewis 2017.
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1Box Text 1. A  Brief Overview of 
Philippine Politics
The structure of Philippine governance is modeled after that of the USA, with its roots in the 
country’s American colonial period (1898-1946). It follows the presidential system as well as 
the tripartite division of the executive, the bicameral legislative, and the judiciary branches. 
However, it does have key differences with the US system. For instance, there is a strong 
centralisation of power on the president, who is elected via popular votes and separately from 
the vice-president.46 
Philippine politics is shaped by a culture of patronage between an oligarchic elite and supporters 
who establish relationships of dependency and obligation with them. Growing out of a system of 
patron-client relations established during the Spanish colonial period (1521-1898), the country’s 
powerful political families and personalities have continued to cultivate clientelistic relationships 
with their loyal followers.47 Consequently, national politics in the Philippines is characterized 
by weak political party ideologiest and affiliations that are completely overwhelmed by strong 
personalistic relationships with presidential contenders who are perceived to possess the right 
image branding.48
This right image branding is highly contextual and depends on an existing regime’s popularity 
or unpopularity. A new president often crafts his/her image in a bid to innovate on, preempt, 
repudiate or reconstruct the image of the preceding regime.49 From this perspective, Duterte’s 
case can be understood as an image branding premised on a repudiation of an existing regime. 
Indeed, his mantra for both in his electoral campaign and his current administration has been 
“change is coming”. This is a promise to offer something different from what critics describe as 
the bureaucratic inefficiency and weak political will of the Aquino administration, which they 
claim suffered from constant “analysis paralysis”.50
46 McCoy 1989; Sidel 1999.
47 Hedman and Sidel 2000.
48 Bionat 1998; Coronel et al. 2004.
49 Teehankee 2016.
50 Singh and Cook 2017.
Chapter 2
Research Methods
From December 2016 to December 2017, we conducted in-
depth interviews with twenty (20) disinformation architects 
at both managerial and staff level, as well as conducted 
participant observation of Facebook community groups 
and Twitter accounts used by our informants. We began 
by reaching out to personal contacts in the ad industry 
whom we know to have worked in political campaigns for 
the Philippine elections in May 2016. We explained to them 
our research interest in digital labor, particularly in the 
procedures and structures of digital political operations 
work. From our initial interviews with managerial-level 
political operators, we used snowball sampling and were 
introduced by managers to the lower-level staff they 
worked with in digital campaigns.
20
C
h
ap
te
r 2
C
h
ap
tr
e
r 
2
21
Interviews
Table 1 presents the different categories of operators we interviewed and their roles in digital 
political campaigns. A digital campaign team is often headed by a senior strategist with a background 
in advertising and PR industry. Based on the campaign objective of their political client, the strategist 
then assembles a team of digital influencers and fake account operators to operationalize the objectives 
set out in the communications plan. We discuss their work structure and social backgrounds in greater 
depth in the next chapter.
Table 1. Respondent list (Total count: 20)
Category Count Roles Professional Backgrounds
Elite advertising and 
PR strategists as Chief 
Disinformation Architects
6 Manages the entire 
campaign project 
and budget; authors 
communication plan; 
hires influencers and 
fake account operators; 
operates several fake 
accounts themselves; 
reports directly to 
politician
Main job at present: Ad and 
PR account director or creative 
director usually in a “boutique” 
agency; social media consultant
Prior roles: broadcast or 
newspaper journalist
Aspirational middle-
class digital workers 
as Anonymous Digital 
Influencers 
5 Operators of one or 
more anonymous 
accounts that command 
>50,000 followers across 
Twitter and Facebook; 
subcontracted by ad and 
PR strategists; often 
paid based on reach and 
engagement they produce 
for a campaign
Main job at present: computer 
programmer; search engine 
optimization specialist online 
freelance worker
Prior roles: broadcast or 
newspaper journalist, marketing 
and finance staff; call center 
employee
Precarious middle-class 
workers as Community-
level Fake Account 
Operators
9 Subcontracted by ad and 
PR strategists or politicians’ 
chief of staff; assigned 
to amplify influencers’ 
messages by reposting and 
retweeting, thus creating 
“illusions of engagement”
Main job at present: government 
staff; social media content 
producer; online freelance worker
Prior jobs: call center employees; 
recent graduate
Table 2. Respondents’ demographic profile (Total count: 20)
Count
Ag
e
25 and below
26 to 40
40 and up
Male
Female
Se
x
9
5
6
9
11
The professional backgrounds of chief disinformation architects say a lot about the roots of digital 
political operations in the ad and PR industry. These strategists maintain day jobs as accounts or 
creative directors of what are known in the industry as “boutique agencies”–local (rather than 
multinational) ad and PR firms. They apply their expertise in social media content management to 
household brands as well as political clients.
Chief architects work closely with anonymous digital influencers who each maintain multiple social 
media accounts with 50,000 to 2,000,000 followers. These popular pages carry distinctive branding 
and post regular updates of humorous, inspirational, or pop culture/celebrity-oriented content. 
During campaign periods, these pages are “activated” to promote hashtags and memes favorable 
to their clients who are often corporate brands or celebrities but occasionally political clients. Page 
owners remain anonymous to their followers, and there is no disclosure of paid content to their 
followers. These anonymous digital influencers maintain day jobs as computer programmers, search 
engine optimization specialists, or marketing and finance staff. 
Meanwhile, there are also those whom we call community-level fake account operators because 
of how they infiltrate existing online communities and engage with real grassroots supporters. 
These online communities include politicians’ fan groups, Philippines-related news pages, or pages 
dedicated to discussing local politics of certain towns or municipalities. These operators are usually 
fresh college graduates, politicians’ administrative staff, and online freelance workers who juggle 
various clients commissioning piecemeal digital work. We learned that many of these operators are 
based in provinces outside Metro Manila. 
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Before each interview, we briefed our informants that our approach was empathetic. We do not 
intend to cast moral judgments on the participants’ actions nor play at investigative journalism to 
“expose” troll account operations and name and shame specific politicians involved in these. For 
instance, writers of different news agencies51 have published pieces and investigative reports aimed at 
“unmask[ing] the trolls” and give an insider view of their operations. While the reports are important 
in providing evidence of such work, the “unmasked” troll operators were attacked, shamed, and 
harassed on social media—which we think are counterproductive to critically understanding the digital 
underground and its interrelationship with mainstream culture in professional practice.52 Conscious 
of the sensitive nature of labels such as “troll” especially in our initial recruitment of participants, we 
thus only used words such as “trolling”, “fake accounts”, and “fake news” after respondents themselves 
used these terms in the course of an interview, and only once we had established sufficient rapport 
with them.53
One ethnographic surprise from our interviews was discovering that many fake account operators 
and anonymous digital influencers are gay and transgender people. We learned from informal chats 
with them how they switch between “male” and “female” voices when operating their multiple fake 
accounts, and how they use snarky Filipino gay humor to poke fun at their online rivals. Strategically 
using affordances for anonymity in social media, they make use of their skills in “gender code-
switching” to effectively deploy the appropriate digital persona to suit objectives of a campaign. While 
some gay and transgender people we met refused to be formally interviewed, presumably to avoid 
risk of their identities being “exposed”, we gained some insight into the specific conditions of “purple 
collar labor”54 as it applies to the digital disinformation industry. Gay and transgender people are 
often assumed as having mastery of the latest pop culture references, exuberant image management 
skills (i.e., from their dating profiles to message board memberships), and fan mobilization discipline 
(i.e., from systematic coordination to support Filipina contenders in annual Miss Universe online 
voting) that guarantee vivaciousness and “spirit” to the social media accounts and campaigns they 
handle.
 
51 For investigative and op-ed piece on “confessions” of paid trolls, see Business Mirror 2016, Caruncho 2016, and Hofileña 2016. We are also 
conscious of risks in inadvertent exposure of anonymous political posters online. There are cases of anonymous bloggers and authors being harassed 
to the point of being forced to reveal themselves.
52 Almario-Gonzalez 2017.
53 We are aware that the terms “troll” and “fake news” come with a very heavy baggage, and their uses are political particularly in how they can 
delegitimize particular speech acts or individuals, i.e., see Tambini 2016. In this report, our use of the term “troll” references the popular Filipino 
discourse which imagines political supporters as an angry, even brainwashed, mob who bully dissenters or opponents who are now newly 
emboldened in the use of offensive and incivil speech from leaders like Duterte. Our own position here on the discourse of the troll is actually inspired 
by Whitney Phillips, who sees troll culture and practice as an extension of mainstream culture rather than as a new or separate entity or practice. See 
Phillips 2015.
54 This brings to mind Emmanuel David’s work on the common practice of “gender-code-switching” among transgender call center workers in the 
Philippines who strategically switch between masculine and feminine personas when responding to client demands and frustrations, see David 2015, 
144.
Online Participant Observation
 
We supplemented our interviews with participant observation of online communities. We observed 
over 20 publicly accessible Facebook groups and pages and Twitter accounts supporting various 
political players at both national and local levels. In the interest of fairness and objectivity, we made 
sure to include explicitly pro- and anti-Duterte groups, as well as pages without explicit representation 
of candidates or political parties, but who claim to curate “social media news”. 
Through participant observation, we examined the content and visual aesthetics of posts crafted by 
influencers, and followed their digital trail across platforms. We observed the tone and speech styles 
of replies and comments to the original posts. This allowed us to better understand how networked 
disinformation campaigns were translated into specific posts or memes. During our fieldwork, 
some participants showed us fake accounts they operated and even shared their passwords to these 
accounts. This provided us an added opportunity to compare and contrast what our participants said 
in the context of the interview with what they actually did in the online profiles they created,55 as we 
were able to check on the digital traces they left in their Facebook histories.
Ethics
 
Following the protocols of university research ethics, we told our informants that we would dis-
identify information that could be traced to individuals. This is why in the data sections of this report, 
we have intentionally obscured some details of the networked disinformation campaigns that our 
participants wanted to keep confidential.
55 Jerolmack and Khan 2014.
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Chapter 3
The Disinformation Interface: 
Work Hierarchies and 
Competitive Collegialities 
of Disinformation Architects
This chapter sketches out the different motivations and aspirations of the architects of networked 
disinformation. Previous research on political trolling and fake news production has shed light on 
how disinformation is usually produced out of the “unholy alliances” formed by lobby groups and 
media companies in the US pushing far-right ideology,56 but are in some cases authored by teenagers 
in Macedonia with purely financial motivations.57 Indeed, as Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan 
have discussed, “agents of information disorder” have diverse backgrounds, and it is important to 
carefully tease out their level of organization, motivations (financial, political, social, psychological), 
and intentions (whether to mislead, harm, or otherwise).58 In this particular section, we argue that 
we cannot always generalize motivations and intentions of disinformation architects, even within 
a single political campaign in one country. Networked disinformation, as with media production, 
involves diverse workers being “creative within constraints”59 and are organized into hierarchies, 
which often lead to unpredictability in campaign outcomes.
We found that the architecture of networked disinformation in the Philippines involves diverse 
and loosely interconnected groups of hierarchized digital workers with varied social backgrounds 
and distinct work responsibilities. >6HH3$*(LQ([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\IRUWKHLQIRJUDSKLFLOOXVWUDWLQJWKH
Architecture of Networked Disinformation].
56 Marwick and Lewis 2017.
57 Silverman and Alexander 2016.
58 Wardle and Derakhshan 2017. 
59 Mayer, Caldwell and Banks 2015.
We observed that chief architects of disinformation play leadership roles in the ad and PR industry 
and are thus socialized into professional “promotional cultures”.60 Situated below them on the 
hierarchy are typically freelance digital workers, who harness their astute knowledge of social media 
infrastructures and pop culture vernaculars when crafting campaign messages to achieve emotional 
resonance with populist publics. While logics of promotional industries govern the strategy of digital 
political campaigns, the execution of these is highly volatile. Their diverse identities and often ironic 
moralities lead to creative, sometimes “messy” translations of campaign objectives that heighten risk 
for divisiveness in political discourse. 
We narrate 
ethnographic 
“portraits” of each 
type of worker and 
identify their main 
work responsibilities 
as well as their social 
backgrounds. We 
end with a section 
that characterizes 
the interrelationships 
among different 
disinformation 
architects as one 
of “competitive 
collegialities”. In what 
immediately follows, 
we provide a literature 
review of academic 
debates on political 
marketing and digital 
disinformation.
60 Promotional culture is defined by Andrew Wernick as the way in which promotional messages have become “co-extensive with our symbolic 
produced world... [such that] promotional culture has fully penetrated the domain of institutional politics, resulting in the explosion of slick election 
campaign advertising and the branding of politicians,” see Wernick 1991 in Penney 2017, 67. In Joel Penney’s account of The Citizen Marketer, 
he expounds on this idea and explains that “consumer-based economies that depend on the promotional industries for their very functioning 
(advertising, public relations, etc.), marketing becomes a kind of uberlogic that comes to pervade all social activities and institutions—even those that 
exist outside of the commercial marketplace”, see Penney 2017, 18. 
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Box Text 2. Networked 
Disinformation as Distributed 
Promotional Labor:
An Academic Review
Digital political marketing, including the troll work of creating fake accounts and authoring 
“fake news,” represent the continuity of—rather than radical departure from—existing logics 
and processes of political marketing. Political marketing is an attempt to connect “distant high 
politics to the everyday”, as Maggie Scammell61 puts it. Behind this practice is the belief that 
ordinary citizens have the agency and ability  to interpret or even reject persuasive marketing 
messages handed down from above by political elites. For Scammell, the “personalization of 
politics” today represents a shift toward a branding model, which emphasizes a reciprocal 
relationship between brands and publics that takes seriously their interests, needs, and 
emotional responses. Ordinary people are viewed here as having what John Corner and Dick 
Pels call “emotional literacies”62 and what Liesbet van Zoonen calls “affective intelligences”63–
specific rationalities that guide people’s engagement with the political sphere, which stem from 
personal experiences and cultural narratives they know, and crucially, feel. In Joel Penney’s 
account of The Citizen Marketer, the main objective then of contemporary political marketing 
is to develop a resonant brand image that will inspire supporters to do much of the promotional 
labor on their own at the grassroots level, rather than attempt to wholly direct this labor from 
the top down.64 Promotional labor here not only includes activities of “rational” political 
persuasion in online discussion spaces, but also crucially involves “emotional” political fandom, 
such as in the performance of contagious enthusiasm where a political supporter “models an 
exuberance for others to follow”.65 
    
61 Scammell 2014.
62 Corner and Pels 2003.
63 Van Zoonen 2005. 
64 Penney 2017,107, emphasis in original. 
65 Penney 2017, 125.
The aim of architects of networked disinformation then is to ignite support at the grassroots 
level and harness the impassioned zeal of “real” political supporters to take on the work of 
persuasion in everyday spaces and rhythms of social media. But in order to achieve emotionally 
resonant messaging and authentic branding that would trigger grassroots support, chief 
disinformation architects need to collaborate with influencers much more fluent in popular 
vernaculars when planning creative executions of digital campaigns. Strategists and 
influencers then harness the support of both community-level fake account operators tasked 
to generate momentum and energy for a campaign and create “illusions of engagement”. 
Then, unpaid grassroots intermediaries and “real” supporters who operate like political fans 
amplify original campaign messages through shares and likes— but also take them forward in 
unpredictable ways. 
Our study proposes the concept of the disinformation interface to capture this critical point 
of intersection between diverse and hierarchized professional disinformation architects and 
the actual “real” political supporters they attempt to inspire. Our use of interface, as developed 
from the writings of anthropologist Norman Long, emphasize the liminal nature of this 
space of interaction, which emphasizes discrepancies of interest and motivations across these 
groupings of disinformation producers. The idea of interface also gives emphasis on the 
porous boundaries between “paid”/“unpaid” or “worker”/“fan” in disinformation practice. As 
we will demonstrate, the project-based and casual nature of disinformation projects means 
that most disinformation architects can compartmentalize or “switch off” this type of work 
and assume more respectable personas derived from their primary or sideline jobs. Often, the 
sharing of political disinformation arises from the complicity of ordinary people who turn 
a blind eye to forms of deception that have grown to be normalized in mainstream culture.
66 Long 2001.
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Moral Justifications in the Disinformation Project
 
The common image of people involved in doing so-called “paid troll” work—as with most digital 
laborers in the global South—is that of the exploited worker in a “digital sweatshop” or a “click 
farm”. They are thought to spend their days executing monotonous and clerical tasks within highly 
regimented and exploitative arrangements. In the specific context of digital work for politics, 
Rongbin Han for instance narrates the precarious labor arrangements that buttress China’s “fifty-cent 
army”, the state-sponsored workers who are paid to act like “spontaneous grassroots support[ers]” 
in online discussion boards.67 Following strict pay structures that emphasize quantity over quality 
of posts and often inflexible instructions in posting content, Han’s insightful research demonstrates 
how rigid work arrangements lead to failed outcomes in digital political operations. Han argues that 
citizens can actually easily identify posts authored by the “fifty-cent army” given how unnatural and 
unspontaneous their content reads. 
In contrast to the Chinese case, what we find in the Philippines is that digital political operations are 
more diversified, with operators working with clients across the political spectrum and occupying a 
hierarchy of roles. Networked disinformation activities in the country follow the general structure of 
project-based digital work, which is characterized by workers on short-term contracts with their clients 
who measure the delivery of output by specific criteria and metrics. Project-based work emphasizes 
individualization and flexibility, where workers are expected to be entrepreneurial in establishing 
their value to their campaign and recognition in the field, demanding high personal commitment and 
resourcefulness in coping with precarious “race-to-the-bottom” work arrangements.68 Project-based 
digital work often entails emotional labor, where workers are expected to manage their feelings in 
order to achieve client and public expectations, as well as work through moral dilemmas in their 
everyday routines. Casual workers sometimes deal with stressful, even traumatic work on their own 
in the absence of clear guidelines, psychosocial support systems, or remuneration.69 
As we illustrate in the following sections, disinformation architects engage in moral justifications 
that their work is not actually “trolling” or “fake news”. They employ various denial strategies that 
allow them to displace moral responsibility by citing that political consultancy is only one project 
(or “sideline”) that does not define their whole identity. The project-based nature of disinformation 
work makes moral displacement easier given the casual, short-term nature of the arrangement, which 
downplays commitment and responsibility to the broader sphere of political practice. 
67 Han 2015, 109.
68 Graham et al. 2017; Ong and Combinido 2017; Qiu, Gregg and Crawford 2014.
69 We are particularly guided by the writings of Arlie Hochschild, Melissa Gregg, and Emmanuel David on emotional 
labor, see Hochschild 2016, Gregg 2011, and David 2015.
Among all the workers we interviewed, nobody self-identified as a “troll” or producer of “fake news”; 
these labels are always projected upon either: 1) unnamed imagined supervillains with total political 
power, or 2) “real” supporters or political fans. People we interviewed all claimed that it is the “real” 
supporters with enthusiastic zeal and fan adoration for their candidate who are more likely to be 
invested in making personal attacks and hateful expressions in online arguments—not professional, 
project-based disinformation architects like themselves.
Moral justifications across the three levels of the networked disinformation hierarchy differ. At the 
top level, strategists are more likely to express discourses of gamification and fictionalization to justify 
their work. They draw from cultural scripts from Western entertainment (“It’s like being Olivia Pope 
of Scandal”) to video games (“It’s game over when you’re found out”) to fictionalize the dangerous 
consequences of their actions and block feelings of real involvement. They even express a certain thrill 
in breaking or rewriting the “rules of the game”, having already surpassed challenges of campaigning 
for corporate brands with tighter ethical guidelines. At the middle level, influencers are more likely 
to express discourses of normalization to justify disinformation production. They cite how they do 
exactly the same work to promote corporate brands and entertainment products, or even volunteer 
their digital expertise for free to support fandoms such as for celebrities or beauty pageant titlists. At 
the lowest level, community-level fake account operators have primarily financial or material reasons 
to justify their work and are often persuaded by others to take on added work for extra cash. 
What is common among these moral justifications about trolling is how they are grounded in an ethics 
of irony, where values and “truths” become relative and self-centered;70 the disinformation architect 
denies responsibility or commitment to the broader public by narrating a personal project of self-
empowerment instead.
Chief Architects: Ad and PR Strategists 
At the top level of networked disinformation campaigns are ad and PR executives who take on the 
role of high-level political operators. Usually they occupy leadership roles in “boutique agencies,” 
and handle a portfolio of corporate brands while maintaining consultancies with political clients on 
70 The  writings of Lilie Chouliaraki on the ethics of irony as perpetuated by marketized logics of consumer marketing 
are especially helpful to think this through. See Chouliaraki 2013. 
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the side.71 They transpose tried-and-tested industry techniques of reputation-building and spin to 
networked disinformation campaigns. Many executives with a track record of achieving worldwide 
trending status for digital campaigns they launched for household brands, telcos, and celebrities saw 
political consultancy as a new challenge for them to apply their skills and leverage their networks.
The chief architects of networked disinformation we interviewed only handled digital political 
operations for their political clients, while more seasoned campaigners managed traditional media 
campaigning. They mentioned working with the traditional media campaigners to coordinate 
communication schedules, selecting the right key opinion leaders and celebrities to endorse their 
candidate, and paying out corrupt journalists to disseminate the core campaign messages they 
collaboratively work on. 
Chief disinformation architects’ main responsibility is to generate and inspire support through online 
engagement. To achieve this, they recruit a team of anonymous digital influencers and fake account 
operators to seed core campaign messages in online spaces and create “illusions of engagement” to 
inspire enthusiasm from real supporters. 
While many chief architects are very savvy with digital technology, they are actually wary of emerging 
techniques in global disinformation campaigns such as using automated software like bots. They 
would much rather rely on the labor of savvy creative writers with knowledge of popular vernaculars 
who can mobilize populist public sentiment. As one chief architect remarked about bots, “Bots are 
like the white walkers in Game of Thrones. They’re stupid and obvious and easily killed. They can’t 
inspire engagement.”
Chief architects nevertheless complained that they are occasionally undervalued by politicians and 
their primary handlers, who are more familiar with campaigning on traditional platforms and still 
value the prestige of landing press releases or sound bites in the top newspapers. Digital strategists 
make the most of this opportunity to establish themselves as the de facto pioneers in a platform 
that they know will come to dominate the future of political propaganda. As one strategist told us, 
“the Philippines does not realize that it is sitting on a stockpile of digital weapons.” Her statement 
recognizes that Filipino digital workers as highly entrepreneurial and resourceful, whether they be 
71 Many multinational ad agencies are said to follow head office protocols that forbid contracts with political clients, 
while others are more lenient and permit this practice. It is an industry “open secret” that boutique PR agencies earn a 
lot from political consultancies and “black ops” crisis management including for corporate brands. Industry insiders we 
met referred to such consultants as “cleaning ladies”–a pejorative term for colleagues who seek to profit from doing the 
dirty work of cleaning up corporate and political mess.
the computer hackers who coded the infamous Y2K virus or the freelance workers who diligently 
work with a global clientele on digital platforms.
Chief architects also see networked disinformation as an opportunity to disrupt existing social 
hierarchies and challenge established power players in political marketing. As Rachel, a young 
strategist shared, “I’d actually like to phase out our company practice of paying out journalists to seed 
or delete news because they can be entitled or unscrupulous. The reason why I'm more passionate 
and committed about online work is because I don't like the politics in journalism.” In this quote, 
it is interesting how corruption in mainstream media is used as a moral justification to dispose 
of institutionalized practice by replacing it with another version—equally lacking in scruples, and 
ultimately benefiting themselves. By expressing statements that normalize or even exaggerate evil or 
corruption in existing public institutions, these ambitious workers imagine themselves as self-styled 
agents of positive change.
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Box Text 3.
Portrait of a Chief Architect
Dom, in her 40s, made her name in the industry as a seasoned creative director for a 
multinational ad agency in the Philippines. She has a reputation as a firebrand with a 
boisterous personality and the amazing skill of coming up with clever corporate taglines. She 
is resourceful with her “rakets” (sideline jobs), as she is the family breadwinner.
Her most lucrative sideline is advising politicians every three years during election season. 
She has handled presidential candidates. She describes her work as a political consultant as 
a more thrilling and challenging version of her everyday work handling corporate brands. 
She uses the same buzzwords from her industry (“brand book”, “brand identity”) even when 
talking about the unscrupulous politicians she has worked for.
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In our interview, Dom drew parallels of “sweat labor” in advertising firms with sweat labor in 
digital political operations. She says: “The only difference is that you’re a high-class prostitute 
in advertising, but in political marketing you’re a low-class prostitute”.
Nevertheless she tries to distance herself from the grimiest aspects of her work when she says, 
“80% of myself is this job. But this is not my soul and this is not me. That's why I want that 
20 percent for my own sanity. Because, come on, if I don't take the 80 percent, how will I eat? 
How can I afford this [house]? No... Really, I am being very honest. I need to have a purpose 
in what I do. That's why I'm carving out that 20 percent to pursue my passion, which is a risk 
on my end because that’s how it is [ganun ’yun eh]. You wanna do something right, risk your 
money, risk your time, your effort, your devotion, your effort, your heart.”
In this quote, she adopts a confessional tone, as if asking for absolution from us in the retelling 
of her life choices and compromises.
In other parts of the interview she takes on a more ironic tone when describing her job. She 
drew comparisons to Olivia Pope of the American television drama Scandal, who is a crisis 
consultant prone to moral compromises but ultimately has a redemptive arc to her dramatic 
narrative.
It is evident that she also relishes the thrill and adrenaline rush she gets from the job. She 
was most excitable but also playfully coy when talking about the hacking and coding skills of 
members in her team. At one point she said, “Maybe if I had this power 10 years ago, I would 
have abused it and I could toy with you guys [kung ano-ano gagawin ko sa inyo]. But now I’m 
in my 40s, it's a good thing I have a little maturity on how to use it. But what I'm really saying 
is we can fuck your digital life without you even knowing about it.”
In that moment, we shuddered to imagine the fates of the poor powerless folks who had 
crossed this woman. 
Anonymous Digital Influencers and Key Opinion Leaders
 
At the mid-level of the hierarchy of networked disinformation are digital influencers. Here it is 
important to distinguish between key opinion leaders such as celebrities and political pundits who 
maintain high profile and boisterous public personas (e.g., Mocha Uson or Ethel Booba), versus 
anonymous micro-influencers who execute more clandestine political operations. In our research, we 
focused on the anonymous digital influencers who usually operate one or more anonymous accounts 
(think: comedy or inspirational pages on Twitter and Facebook) that entertain their followers with 
their specific brand of hilarity or commentary while occasionally slipping in paid content into their 
feed. These influencers harness their astute understanding of the public’s pop culture tastes, political 
sentiments, and social media behaviors to become expert attention-hackers. 
Anonymous digital influencers expect their followers of between 50,000 to 2,000,000 to share and like 
their messages with the aim of gaming Twitter trending rankings, and create viral posts on Facebook 
so as to influence mainstream media coverage.72 Translating the campaign plans of the ad and PR 
strategists into shareable content, they use snark, humor or inspirational messaging consistent with 
the social media personas they operate to post content that is favorable or unfavorable to particular 
politicians, often anchored by a hashtag agreed upon between them and the chief architects. 
A few anonymous digital influencers take on the role of being second-level subcontractors. As sub-
subcontractors, they work as intermediaries between chief architects and their fellow anonymous 
influencers to whom they delegate disinformation work. 
All the anonymous influencers we met take on this role on a part-time, per-project basis, as many of 
them have day jobs in IT, corporate marketing, and other sideline work such as online community 
management for celebrities’ fan clubs. This kind of work has the trappings of the precarious and 
aspirational middle-class lifestyle common to most kinds of freelance digital work in the Philippines.73 
Anonymous influencers deeply enjoy being in an aspirational work environment. They recall with 
pride how they do disinformation work while booked overnight in a five-star hotel suite or in a 
mansion in a gated village. They also get excited by the material and symbolic rewards that chief 
architects promise to the best performing digital worker in the team, such as the latest iPhone model 
72 The aim to break into mainstream media coverage is similar with the attention-hackers described by Alice Marwick 
and Rebecca Lewis in the US context, see the Data and Society report by Marwick and Lewis 2016. However the 
intention behind this is not ideological but driven primarily by the impassioned zeal of fans supporting their much 
admired political personality. This is reflective of the personality-based political system in the Philippines with a weak 
party system that has little differentiation in ideology and policy, see Hutchcroft 1991.
73 David 2015; Fabros 2016; Graham et al 2017 
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Box Text 4. Portrait of an 
Anonymous Influencer 
28 year-old Georgina is a transgender digital marketer with a computer engineering degree 
from one of the leading national universities. She remembers getting her start in digital 
marketing work after being rejected many times over when interviewing for jobs directly 
related to her degree. With her long black hair, short-sleeved shirts, and soft-spoken tone, 
she felt she was never given a fair shot by interviewers in a male-dominated field, who were 
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or a meet-and-greet with a top-level celebrity managed by their boutique PR agency.
As part of the precarious and entrepreneurial middle class, anonymous digital influencers are driven 
by economic opportunities to take on disinformation work. They have previously endured less 
stable, less financially and socially rewarding jobs in the creative industries and see influencer work 
as giving them more freedom, especially to choose clients. Curiously, we found that there is usually 
an alignment between digital influencers and the political clients they serve: not in terms of ideology 
or issues, but in terms of fan admiration. Some influencers hired by political clients they do not like 
would subcontract work to a fellow influencer they know who is a “real fan” of that politician.
While scholars in the Philippines continue to debunk discourses of bobotante (“stupid voters”) and 
argue that poor people have different rationales for selling their votes, hence have a “negotiate[d] 
support” to politicians,74 we found out that paid influencers and even community-level fake account 
operators have similar internalizations as well, which reflect in their work output. For instance, in the 
portrait below, influencer Georgina observes that in the pool of anonymous influencers she manages 
during campaigns, those that wholeheartedly support the candidate are the most hardworking. “Real 
fans” are motivated to come up with 30 to 50 posts a day compared to non-supporters who only do 
five posts. 
74 See the news article published by Nakpil 2016 about a forum where academics discussed and debunked the idea that 
Duterte supporters are “fanatics”.
quick to assume she’s too maarte [fussy] to build or maintain computer hardware. She told 
us how she had to be especially resourceful in finding work and trying out specialized digital 
boutiques to find a stable source of income that could support her family, as well as her save 
up for her own transition and reassignment procedures.
One digital marketing boutique she worked for specialized in search engine optimization, 
helping clients improve their Google Page Rank. During the interview, she narrated how 
their marketing portfolio included nefarious techniques of using fake and clickbait headlines 
and websites to drive web traffic to their corporate clients. The nonchalance with which she 
narrated this seemed to suggest that such practices are never regarded with shame or regret 
in her workplace, but are viewed instead as enterprising or innovative. 
An early adopter of new technology, she claimed she has always been fascinated by new 
financial opportunities offered by digital platforms. When she grew in understanding of the 
influencer industry a few years ago, she created what is popularly called a “quote account” on 
Twitter, Facebook and Instagram and steadily grew its followers seeking daily inspiration 
from its feed of bland feel-good positivity quotes and memes. Eventually, she was hired to 
promote campaigns for local telcos, then celebrities and their movies, then political clients. 
She volunteers her powers of noise creation and “signal scrambling” for people and causes she 
believes in, such as promoting her favorite celebrity crushes or making sure Miss Philippines 
dominates social media conversations in the lead-up to the annual Miss Universe pageant. 
The key task of anonymous influencer accounts, as with regular influencer accounts, is to 
achieve authenticity: “Sometimes clients insist on being explicit with branding or hashtags, 
but that’s how you lose followers–when you become labeled as bayaran [paid stooge]”. 
Georgina enjoys relative privilege as the right-hand woman of a chief disinformation architect. 
This means that after a campaign briefing, it becomes her responsibility to assemble and 
manage the team of anonymous influencers–people with whom she maintains relationships 
of “competitive collegialities” (to be explained in a later section). Georgina introduced us 
during fieldwork to other “trans trolls” who use lifelong skills of gender code-switching to 
deploy the right personas and hit the right notes when broadcasting deceptive messages in, 
quite paradoxically, the most authentic way possible. 
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Community-level Fake Account Operators
 
At the lowest level of the networked disinformation hierarchy are community-level fake account 
operators. These workers are tasked to follow what we call script-based disinformation work, 
which consists of posting written and/or visual content previously designed by the strategists on a 
predetermined schedule, as well as affirming and amplifying key messages by strategists and influencers 
through likes and shares, thus creating “illusions of engagement”. Community-level fake account 
operators are tasked to post a prescribed number of posts or comments on Facebook community 
groups,75 news sites, or rival politicians’ pages per day. By actively posting content from generic 
greetings to political messages within Facebook community groups, they are often responsible for 
maintaining activity and initiating bandwagon effects that would drive real grassroots supporters to 
come out and openly express their enthusiasm for a particular politician. 
They usually post positive messages of support for the politician and agree publicly with to favorable 
news articles. But other times, they can initiate quarrels with supporters of rival politicians. They 
use ad hominem attacks or make fun of other people’s bad grammar as a way of shutting down an 
opponent’s argument. They mention that their ultimate failure as fake account operators on Facebook 
is when they are called out as a fake account (“That’s game over! That usually shuts us up”). 
There are different labor arrangements for this kind of low-level troll work. Most of the respondents 
in our study were fake account operators working within politicians’ own administrative staff. These 
are usually junior-level employees tasked to “help” with a political campaign, and they usually begrudge 
the fact that there is no additional pay for this kind of publicly derided work they did not originally 
sign up for. Other fake account operators whom we have yet to formally interview face-to-face are 
freelancers who are paid on a per-day basis upon achieving a set number of posts or comments, and 
office-based fake account operators who work in a “call-center” kind of arrangement, some of whom 
operate in provinces that are bailiwicks of politicians.
Community-level fake account operators’ motivation is primarily financial. We found out that some 
of their fake accounts on Facebook or Twitter had prior histories before their political trolling work, 
used as part of pyramid marketing schemes. These “networking” schemes required them to visually 
display groups of friends; fake accounts were one way to artificially manufacture group support. 
75 Anthropologists call these modes of exchange as “phatic communication” where what is important is not the content 
of what is being said but the ritual of affirming and maintaining social bonds through routine communicative exchange. 
See the work of Malinowski 1993.
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Box Text 5. Portrait of a 
Reluctant Troll
Risa admitted to us that she operated fake accounts on Facebook in the run-up to the May 
2016 national elections. Reporting to a very domineering, take-no-prisoners Chief of Staff 
of a fledgling mayoral candidate in one of the largest cities in Metro Manila, Risa and her 
cohort of fresh college graduates couldn’t but agree to doing the shameful work of creating 
fake accounts and and trolling Facebook community pages. What’s worse is that this was 
additional work, without additional pay. In election season after all, taking on additional work 
showed pakikisama [getting along with others] and utang na loob [fulfilling debt obligations], 
especially for young people who were fresh out of college.
Following the example of the Chief of Staff who maintained two fake accounts herself, Risa 
and her colleagues came up with fake profiles and populated a Facebook group dedicated to 
the city they were trying to win. Some staff members were bold enough to even troll the 
opposing candidate’s Facebook page with a witty hashtag that exaggerated his ineptitude in 
managing the city’s disaster response program. 
Risa was different. It was very obvious that her heart and spirit were broken by this kind 
of work. Idealistic and fiercely intelligent, Risa was actually the top student of one of the 
most competitive programs in a leading national university; she had hoped this job would 
lead toward glowing recommendation letters to get her into law school. She didn’t admit it, 
but it seemed quite probable that she intentionally sabotaged her own fake account. She had 
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Many fake account operators appear to be workers who have previously tried out many other risky 
enterprises as a means to achieve financial stability. While in many cases fake account operators 
collude with people or groups who offer financial rewards in exchange for accomplishing morally 
sketchy tasks, subtle forms of resistance can also emerge, as narrated in the box text below.
only become Facebook friends with 20 people, unlike her other colleagues who maintained 
“bikini troll” accounts that lured 500 new friends with overtly sexual profile pictures. 
Unlike her colleagues, Risa never spoke about the “thrill” of creating viral memes. The 
discomfort was evident in her body language during the interview: her narration was slow 
and stilted, as if the words brought her physical pain the moment they had left her body. 
Risa survived those difficult months through humorous banter with her colleagues. They 
poked fun at the Chief of Staff by calling her “Madam” behind her back and described the 
whole experience as an adventure. “It was like a roller coaster ride I didn’t sign up for!”, she 
said. What got her through was the assurance the gig was all temporary: she had tendered 
her resignation letter to “Madam” three months before the elections and was counting 
down to her last day at work. She was so done.
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Competitive Collegialities
 
We use the concept of competitive collegialities to describe the complicated nature of the work 
relationships among disinformation architects at different levels of the hierarchy. The different 
disinformation producers find themselves compelled to work together even if their professional 
aspirations are ultimately at odds with each other: while chief disinformation architects want to 
maintain the work hierarchy they established, lower-level political operators aim to overcome the 
power asymmetries. 
In some key ways, this kind of relationship follows broader dynamics of work relationships in the 
creative industries. Those in the higher rungs of these industries are keen to maintain power and status 
hierarchies within their organisations. But at the same time, they establish incentives that encourage 
those at the lower rungs to aspire for upward mobility at all costs, even by self-exploitation.76 This 
desire for upward mobility is especially resonant with the Philippines’ digital freelance workforce. Key 
to this is the overly optimistic line that the country’s government officials and digital freelance gurus 
76 See Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011.
promote, as they celebrate the achievements of this “sunshine” digital industry in lifting individuals 
into the middle class.77 That said, precarious digital workers also find diverse psycho-social rewards 
from the work they do and friendships they develop with their colleagues.78 
The Need for Collegiality
Chief architects of networked disinformation require the promotional labor of digital influencers who 
are more fluent with popular vernaculars and are able to weaponize these into effective social media 
posts that can mobilize public sentiment. Conversely, influencers and fake account operators also need 
the chief architects to broker projects and consultancies for them, whether digital disinformation or 
other kinds of digital work. Strategists are the indispensable link between political clients who wish 
to mobilize click armies and the influencers and operators who want to monetize their legions of 
followers. Since the strategists’ client portfolio often comprises not just only politicians, but also 
commercial clients and celebrities, influencers and fake account operators need them to access a wide 
variety of projects and sources of income.
The anonymous influencer Georgina, for instance, said that she got most of her “sideline” work 
from the PR strategist Kimberly. Because Kimberly had been crucial to many of Georgina's freelance 
opportunities, Georgina found it important to maintain very good professional relations with her—
even if she imagined herself as possibly competing with her in the future. “My goal is to become a 
strategist too,” Georgina shared with us. “I want to eventually interface with clients directly and lead 
teams on projects, because that’s pretty much what I have been doing when working with other 
influencers. I guess I’ll do this when I learn more about communications planning.”
Digital influencers and fake account operators need the seasoned digital strategists to lend their work 
an aura of professionalism and, consequently, legitimacy. Indeed, the strategists do the crucial work 
of interfacing with clients who do not necessarily wish to know all the lurid details behind the viral 
hashtag campaigns they had paid for.  From their leadership positions in the prestigious advertising 
and PR industry, strategists in effect legitimize digital disinformation projects for both political clients 
and their team of digital workers. Strategists repackage the populist strategies of weaponizing popular 
vernaculars by using the professionalized jargon of the promotional industries. Corporate marketing 
terms such as “velocity”, “influencer collaboration”, and “message scheduling” in effect neutralize the 
stigma surrounding political campaign strategies of “mobilizing click armies” and “hiring paid trolls”.
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77 Abara and Heo 2013; Beerepoot and Hendriks 2013; Mann and Graham 2016.
78 David 2015; Fabros 2016.
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The Inevitability of Competition
To entice digital influencers to collaborate with them in executing disinformation campaigns, the 
chief architects of networked disinformation construct an aspirational imaginary about their line 
of work.79 High-level strategists do this both through material  and symbolic means, promising 
influencers expensive gadgets and organizing photo-ops with their own celebrity clients to further 
enhance influencers’ fame and status.
To motivate digital influencers to consistently design the most effective disinformation content, the 
high-level strategists remunerate them using a competitively tiered salary mechanism, which follows 
existing conventions of corporate marketing contracts. Influencers hired for the same project are 
paid differently based on their engagement rates; those who garner the highest number of likes and 
retweets are paid higher than the others. This pushes the influencers to compete and outdo each 
other in crafting viral messages, upping the ante in their use of populist vernaculars. Their weapons 
of choice: conjuring an enemy, invoking a state of crisis, and deploying incivil language for “shock 
effect.”
They may entice digital influencers to aspire for this line of work, but strategists simultaneously put in 
place mechanisms that enforce existing power hierarchies. Strategists claimed that they shuffled the 
rules of engagement every year, to keep influencers constantly playing catch-up to developments in 
the field. Amongst other things, they would change salary schemes, disinformation design strategies, 
and team compositions. They were also careful to guard their knowledge of the field and keep their 
key contacts in industry and politics close to their chest. 
Competitive collegialities of disinformation work have led to very complicated relationships amongst 
the different workers. A number of them see each other as colleagues who have to work together on 
79 For a thorough description of the commercial structure of the digital influencer industry, See Abidin 2016.
As a case in point, PR strategist Kimberly explained that to win an account with potential political 
clients, she would parade her track record of successful promotional campaigns with big commercial 
brands and local and Hollywood celebrities. She would always use “professional jargon” when labeling 
digital influencers and community-level fake account operators with the blandly generic term “digital 
support workers”. She would justify to clients how “digital support workers” are similarly used by 
brands and celebrities to achieve top trending hashtags.
projects and, sometimes even become friends. We met a small group of transgenders who operate over 
a dozen anonymous digital influencer accounts between them. They help each other professionally 
through client referrals, and provide emotional support for each other’s personal challenges and 
journeys of gender transition. 
However, most disinformation workers treat each other as competitors who need to edge each other 
out. It has become common for digital influencers to hack and steal each other’s Twitter and Facebook 
accounts, or the accounts of high-level political strategists in a bid to displace them. Accounts with 
huge followings are the biggest targets as these can net higher remuneration for campaigns.
These dynamics lend a “Wild West” and “easy come, easy go” character to the work of networked 
disinformation. Indeed, the relationships amongst the digital political operators mirror a more general 
trend in the online freelance promotional industry, where there is a constant game of one-upmanship 
brought about by the sheer proliferation of influencers.80 
One major consequence of competitive collegialities has been the displacement of responsibility for 
the outcomes of networked disinformation. Most workers in the disinformation architecture are 
focused on staying ahead (for the strategists) or, more desperately, getting ahead (for the influencers 
and the community-level fake account operators) in the field of disinformation, and more broadly, 
in the promotional industries. As such, no one wants to address or assume accountability for the 
vitriol, misogyny, and racism, amongst other things, that emerge in the aftermath of many networked 
disinformation campaigns. None of them is interested in self-regulation.
In our interviews with the different disinformation architects, we asked them who they thought 
was ultimately responsible for producing disinformation and fake news. Each of them responded 
by passing on responsibility to someone else, perpetually displacing accountability. The high-level 
strategists say that they never peddle outright lies, only fudged half-truths. Digital influencers say that 
coming up with actual fake news and disinformation content is produced by unnamed others in the 
disinformation architecture, or by “real supporters” from the grassroots. In many ways, this is all goes 
back to how the work of networked disinformation is not bound by established professional relations 
and ethics, nor by a sense of care and concern for the democratic freedom of speech that they often 
end up undermining.
80 For a fuller discussion of the “Wild West” character of the online freelance industry, see Keen 2007.
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Fake News in the Making:  
Principles and Practices of 
Networked Disinformation 
Production
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The architecture of networked disinformation can be 
described as a democratized but hierarchized network 
of loose relations amongst the producers of digital 
disinformation campaigns. As we discussed in the previous 
section, these producers come from different backgrounds, 
with diverse motivations and ironic moralities, which result 
in complicated relationships with each other.
To better understand the production dynamics that govern such a network of operators, we identify 
the tension at the heart of crafting networked disinformation, which is  between the promotional 
communication principles of 1) controlled interactivity and  2) volatile virality. We show 
how this tension animates both the 1) design and 2) implementation phases of disinformation 
campaigns. We also point out the consequences of this tension on the proliferation of information 
pollution and the ossification of filter bubbles in the Philippines’ online political discussion spaces. 
Defining Controlled Interactivity and Volatile Virality 
In discussing the production of networked disinformation, we look at how the collaborative work 
of the different disinformation architects results in a process torn between competing principles of 
promotional communication (see Figure 2). We flesh out the anatomy of this production process, 
identifying the key stages and techniques that comprise it. We also shed light on the fine line that 
separates production from what Joel Penney describes as the eventual “viral” take-up and further 
amplification of such forms of political marketing by grassroots intermediaries.81 In so doing, we 
contribute to a fuller account of the dynamics that operate within and around the disinformation 
interface between political campaign producers and real supporters.
One of the promotional communication principles that are at play in the production of networked 
disinformation is controlled interactivity: the maintenance of message discipline throughout 
the digital political campaign process. As Jennifer Stromer-Galley puts it, controlled interactivity 
is a digital two-step flow model of influence where political campaigners aim to disseminate a 
common script by carefully and strategically putting enthusiastic supporters to work as peer-to-peer 
conduits for organizational messages.82 The clearest expression of this principle can be found in the 
disinformation design techniques used by the chief architects of networked disinformation, which 
are rooted in tried-and-tested professional practices such as establishing key campaign objectives and 
using brand bibles.
The other principle of promotional communication at play is what we call volatile virality: trading 
“message discipline” in digital media campaigns for message popularity with all its unpredictable social 
consequences. Widening the reach of a campaign message takes precedence over the distortions and 
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mistranslations by a campaign’s grassroots intermediaries and enthusiastic real supporters. This 
principle is most evident in the disinformation translation and implementation techniques deployed 
by digital influencers and community-level account operators, which are driven by individual 
operators’ attempts to weaponize popular vernaculars to maximize the reach of social media posts.
Figure 2. The twin principles of networked disinformation
Below we plot out how the tension between controlled interactivity and volatile virality shape 
the stages and techniques of networked disinformation production. We show the emergence of a 
fractured production process, with campaign design determined by ad and PR principles of strategic 
communication and with campaign translation and implementation influenced by the race to ride the 
highly volatile currents of populist sentiment.
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The Stages and Techniques of Networked Disinformation 
Production
The disinformation architects say that the stages of networked disinformation production closely 
resemble the structure of the ad and PR communications plan: establishing campaign objectives, 
mapping out audience touch points, and identifying the roles that different media platforms play 
in translating and meeting the specific aims of a campaign (see Figure 3).83 We contend, however, 
that what makes networked disinformation production much more pernicious is that the competing 
promotional communication principles that drive it have important consequences for the fragile 
health of transitional democracies like that of the Philippines. This is a theme we return to later on. 
Here what we would like to do is show how the stages of this particular production are shaped either 
by the predominance of the principle of controlled interactivity or volatile virality.
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Figure 3. Stages of networked disinformation production
83 Davis 2013.
Stage 1: Campaign Plan Design
This stage is most strongly governed by the principle of controlled interactivity, being primarily the 
domain of the chief architects of networked disinformation. Here, these high-level political strategists 
deploy an array of techniques that are well established in corporate marketing.
This stage begins with identifying key campaign objectives. Here the high-level strategists always start 
by listening to the communication concerns raised by political clients who approach them. These 
concerns might be related to electoral campaigns, a practice that is already well mapped out in political 
communication scholarship.84 However, they might also be related to moments outside the electoral 
context, where most of the disinformation work lies. In “ordinary times”, the strategists might be 
asked to seed the personal brand of political clients for future elections or to protect this brand in the 
face of scandalous issues. Strategists might also be hired to push for issue advocacies and even official 
national legislation that would be politically or economically beneficial to their clients. Later on in 
this chapter, we discuss how implementing these objectives might at times involve rolling out tried-
and-tested dirty campaign tactics. These range from political silencing and historical revisionism to 
using misogyny and classism, all of  which can perniciously impact on democratic politics.
Identifying the key campaign objectives is, in principle, collaborative, in that the high-level strategists 
figure these out together with their political clients. It is often the case, however, that the clients do 
not know or even care enough about campaign plan design to be intensely involved in its intricacies. 
As the strategist Rachel shared, she once worked on the presidential campaign of a veteran politician 
who could not be bothered to scrutinize the campaign objectives she drafted. She said, “Compared to 
corporate clients who are fastidious in nitpicking everything you present them, this candidate, who’s 
supposed to be very politically experienced, didn’t really understand how the communication game 
worked. So he just left all of that to me.”
Once the campaign objectives are set, the chief architects of networked disinformation then use 
another professional technique to solidify their campaign plan design. They craft core campaign 
messages that are supposed to undergird all the disinformation campaign materials that are produced. 
Strategists draw from political campaigning principles to craft messages that resonate with audience 
expectations of a candidate’s personality branding or issue advocacy.85 They also use their astute 
instincts and extensive experience in taking the public pulse about politicians and political issues 
to come up with key themes that unify all the disinformation materials. The strategist Grace, for 
84 Scammell 2016; see also Davies 2006; Esser and Pfetch 2004.
85 Iyengar and Simon 2000; see also Gloria et al. 2004.
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instance, explained to us why the #NasaanAngPangulo (or #WhereIsThePresident) campaign 
against ex-President Benigno Aquino, Jr. was so successful. She said that this attack mode of hashtag 
campaigning stoked the public’s growing dissatisfaction with then-President Aquino, who seemed to 
be perpetually absent in the aftermath of major disasters.
The final professional technique that high-level strategists use in this campaign plan design stage is to 
identify the audience touch points for communicating the core campaign messages. Using a strict and 
coordinated scheduling framework, they disseminate their messages through platforms like Twitter 
and Facebook as well as campaign materials like hashtags, memes, and fake news write-ups and 
videos. This is something we return to at the third stage of the networked disinformation production. 
Here it should be noted that even if networked disinformation campaigns are conducted over digital 
media, they still have to be done in concert with mainstream media disinformation campaigns. These 
mainstream media campaigns involve longstanding media-capture practices such asDVWURWXUƛLQJ or 
masking the real sponsors of an advertising material to make it appear more authentic or grassroots-
driven and, in the specific context of the Philippines, “AC/DC (attack-collect/defend-collect)” or paying 
journalists to write attack pieces on an opponent or to defense pieces for their principal.86 
High-level strategists also plot out how digital influencers and community-level fake account 
operators—vis-a-vis key opinion leaders—should carry the core campaign messages. The strategists 
designate particular roles for these operators: to seed messages, to amplify, to throw shade, or to agitate 
and provoke discussion. In line with the professional practice of micro-targeting, the strategists also 
ask these account operators to engage with existing networks of audiences, ranging from celebrity 
fan clubs to grassroots political communities. This is something we flesh out in the following stage of 
networked disinformation production.
Stage 2: Click Army Mobilization
This second stage in networked disinformation production involves determining what and how 
social media accounts should be mobilized in a campaign. Here, collaboration between the different 
architects of networked disinformation becomes more pronounced. Consequently, tension between 
the promotional communication principles of controlled interactivity and volatile virality becomes 
more evident at this stage.
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86 Hofileña 1998.
The aspiration of chief architects of networked disinformation to controlled interactivity can be seen 
most clearly in their use of brand bibles to carefully construct the Facebook fake account/s that they 
manage. Central to this is the creation of a manual that details the brand identity of the fake avatar: that 
is, their social background, personality traits, daily routines, alongside their political stance and their 
target audience. Because the strategists use these accounts to establish the core campaign messages 
that digital influencers pick up on, they are keen to ensure message discipline and consistency. This 
is especially important because the strategists often pass on the cumbersome work of engaging with 
these accounts to operators working directly under them; a detailed framework for the content and 
the style of posts keeps the messaging on-brand. Dom shared with us, for example, that one successful 
account that she created was branded as a “bikini troll”: a highly attractive, well-educated, young 
woman with a scantily clad profile photo. She said that accounts like this was the easiest way to gain 
followers and friends. But she also said that the were risks involved, such as receiving dick pics and 
unsolicited social advances. On the overall, however, such accounts did well in their role to provide 
“illusions of engagement”.
But even in Facebook fake accounts that have brand bibles, the principle of volatile virality creeps in. 
As mentioned above, the high-level strategists pass on the 24/7 running of these accounts to lower-
level account operators under their employ. This enables the accounts a high degree of algorithmic 
visibility, as they are able to maintain intense interactivity and engagement with their followers and 
supporters. This also means, however, that operators may sometimes post materials that are off-
brand. As Dom recalls, she once had one more her Facebook accounts go “schizophrenic” because it 
was manned by different operators at different times of the day. When the operator was relatively 
competent, then the account would be on-brand with its “bikini troll” performance of an attractive 
and classy woman. But when the operator was relatively less competent, the account would go 
temporarily rogue, posting material that undermined the branding of the account. Dom distinctly 
remembers one operator posting a beach vacation photo with the badly Englished caption “I’m so 
relax”, which made the strategist feel anything but relaxed.
Meanwhile, the necessity of relying on volatile virality can be seen in the high-level strategists 
technique of tapping digital influencers’ social media accounts to further amplify core campaign 
messages. In doing this, the strategists sacrifice message discipline for increased message virality. On 
one hand, the influencer accounts have previously existed and have already been deployed in prior 
commercial and/or celebrity campaigns. Unlike the Facebook fake accounts that the strategists have 
built from scratch, these influencer accounts already carry with them a prior branding. Most of them 
are already established as a celebrity fan page, a politician fan page, or an inspirational quote page, 
amongst others. This prior branding is something that the strategists have to accommodate in their 
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campaign design plan. But on the other hand, the previous existence of the digital influencers’ social 
media accounts means that they also have cultivated a large number of organic followers. These 
might be comprised of fans of celebrity couples, supporters of political candidates, beauty pageant 
fans, or followers who simply like the quotes, memes, and/or video content being posted. It is this 
genuine and readily accessible reach with organic followers that the high-level strategists are after.
We learned that in mobilizing social media armies, the public persona of an account should fit its 
role in a campaign. For attack campaigns, as an example, chief architects look to invite anonymous 
influencers behind Twitter accounts that are feisty and aggressive. A perfect example of this is an 
account called Shutayin Sila sa Sindak (Kill Them With Fright). This account has a display photo of 
an angry stick figure that  is matched by a cover photo of a gun pointed directly at the viewer. Its bio 
also says “Boo! You die!” The account is full of mean tweets, expletives, and death threats and is well 
suited for “digital black ops”. As the digital influencer Georgina says, “it’s no-nonsense and bitchy, so 
use it for mudslinging!”
Stage 3: Creative Executions
The final stage of networked disinformation production is where the digital political operators most 
closely interact with grassroots intermediaries and real supporters. At this stage, the concern of the 
digital political operators is to translate and implement the campaign plan design into social media 
posts that can weaponize the impassioned zeal of these intermediaries and supporters. In the way 
they deploy particular techniques to achieve this work, we once again see the tension between the 
promotional communication principles of controlled interactivity and volatile virality.
In some of the creative execution techniques, controlled interactivity is more pronounced than volatile 
virality because of the chief disinformation architects’ generally strong control of the messaging. 
Take for instance the uses of trending and “signal scrambling” on Twitter, which aim to hijack 
attention in online and mainstream media. These techniques are meant to make specific discussions 
around a politician’s personal branding or policy initiatives become viral on Facebook, so that they 
subsequently become picked up they mainstream media. The goal here is to exploit mainstream new 
media’s vulnerability to reporting items that become popular in social media.87
With trending, what the high-level strategists do is craft hashtags that they think not only encapsulate 
a campaign’s core messages, but also express these in witty, memorable, and shareable ways. They 
87 Marwick and Lewis 2017.
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would then ask the digital influencers to use their existing Twitter accounts to make these hashtags 
trend at a time and duration. The strategist Grace told us that she can orchestrate this so precisely 
that she often uses it as a demo tool for her would-be political clients. For instance, she tells one of 
her clients “At 6:00 pm go online and I will show you what I can do to your campaign... I always 
show what I can do it instead of making empty promises.” She then has this client observe with her 
in real-time how her influencers make a hashtag trend globally. Grace proudly goes on to say that the 
“The client could not believe it because no consultant had given him a worldwide trending hashtag. 
Needless to say, I got his account.” 
Meanwhile, the aim of the high-level strategists with signal scrambling is to negate the hashtag of 
an opposing campaign by preventing it from trending at all. For this, they use an obfuscation tactic 
that relies on confusing and dividing the people who support a opposing campaign’s hashtag, thereby 
lowering that hashtag’s rank in Twitter’s list of trending topics. What they do specifically is to craft a 
decoy hashtag that is similar-looking but syntactically-different from that of the opposing campaigns. 
They would then have the digital influencers use their Twitter accounts to seed these decoy hashtags 
that would split the community. As an example of this, Grace explained that they would, for instance, 
torpedo the hashtag “heart” by deploying hashtags like “he5rt” or “h3art”. 
Despite the predominance of the high-level strategists in designing the messages for the two Twitter 
techniques discussed above, the digital influencers nevertheless still have crucial translation work to 
perform. To be sure, trending and signal scrambling are governed primarily by controlled interactivity, 
in that the strategist expect their hashtags to be used and the main goal of the fake account operators 
is for the campaign to hit number one. As the influencer Georgina narrates, what she does is to set 
a certain time when she and a team of 10 influencers are to create posts that carry the prescribed 
hashtag. This prompts the followers of their accounts--comprised of some fake account operators but 
mostly of grassroots supporters–to retweet their posts. But the two techniques are also predisposed 
to volatile virality, as the digital influencers have their own ways of achieving engagement that they 
express through their individually tailored posts. As Georgina explains, some influencer accounts 
use not only popular vernaculars, but also bikini pictures and shirtless celebrities, just to get likes 
and retweets. This is also a function of the financial incentive schemes that reward influencers’ 
promotional labor according to metrics of reach and engagement.
In some other creative execution techniques, the principle of volatile virality is much more marked 
than that of controlled interactivity. This is especially true for techniques that require the digital 
influencers to use their understanding of popular vernaculars to craft creative and engaging posts 
that can generate likes and shares. These principally include implementing positive branding, digital 
black ops, and diversionary tactics. To be sure, these techniques are all anchored on the high-level 
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strategists’ campaign plan designs and so have message discipline built into them. But then again, 
these techniques also require the high-level strategists to allow the digital influencers a high degree of 
flexibility and even agency in their translation work, so that message virality can be achieved.
The goal of the digital influencers in positive branding is to help push for the personal branding that 
the high-level strategists have created for their political clients. Conversely, in conducting digital 
black ops, they contribute to intensifying attacks on the personal branding of their political clients’ 
opponents. These techniques have their roots in the well-established political communication 
strategies of positive and negative campaigning that have long dominated mainstream media election 
advertisements. Like traditional positive campaigning, positive branding aims to market political 
clients in their best light. This can be mean highlighting the unique selling point of their personalities, 
like posting memes that cast Duterte as a politician with a simple lifestyle, fearless attitude, and strong 
political will.88 And it can also be as insidious as revising the atrocious personal or familial history 
of clients to put them in better light, like sharing YouTube videos that tell a revisionist account of 
the 20-year Marcos regime as “the golden age of the Philippines” in a bid to restore the political 
luster of the Marcos family (see Figure 4).89 Meanwhile, digital black ops is the online version of the 
traditional black ops done via the mainstream media. Often deployed in concert, these techniques 
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Figure 4. The Marcos regime as the Golden Age of the Philippines
88 Cantera 2016.
89 Compare a sample revisionist YouTube video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C0fsuPU6sr8) and  the anti-
revisionist ‘Martial Law Museum’ project of Ateneo de Manila University (https://martiallawmuseum.ph/)
Figure 5. Duterte as China’s loyal lapdog
90 Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Bennet and Iyengar 2008.
91 Moffitt and Tormey 2014.
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rely on mudslinging, rumormongering, and innuendo to take down a political opponent’s brand. One 
meme, for example, challenges Duterte’s image of being fearless and insinuates that when it comes to 
China, he acts like a loyal lapdog (see Figure 5). Studies reveal that an unfortunate cumulative effect 
of such content is an increasing disenchantment with democratic processes such as elections.90
Unlike mainstream media electoral ads that carry the strong message discipline of most mainstream 
media content, however, the content created by the influencers can be much more volatile. In 
one of the positive branding campaigns that Dom oversaw for a political client, she said that she 
encountered issues with the amplification strategies that one of the influencers used. She said that this 
particular influencer made the decision to generate likes and shares about their campaign by pairing 
the messages she had designed for the politician with shirtless photos of male celebrities. “That totally 
undermined the squeaky clean image I was building for the client!”, she said. 
As Figure 5 above indicates, what is troubling with the translation work that digital influencers do 
for digital black ops is that this often involves performing a populist political style. This generates 
tremendous virality among grassroots supporters, but also brings toxicity to the tenor of public 
political discussions. Echoing the work of Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey, some of the key 
elements in the style that the influencers use are: appealing to a community of discontent, evoking a 
state of crisis, and using incivil language.91 Some of the influencers we talked to shared with us that 
what they like about being anonymous is that one can just weave in and out of their online avatars. 
Influencer Michael, for instance, shares, “being a character or a ‘pseudo’ is only very fleeting because 
you are not the person. You just assume that personality. You trend for a while and then move on.” 
The digital influencers use a mix of the elements of the populist political style in two key ways. One 
is when they bring up divisive issues that push grassroots supporters towards expressing hatred over 
people who are perceived to be on the other side of the divide. Take for instance the posts holding 
to account former President Benigno Aquino III and his allies for the mishaps in the post-Typhoon 
Haiyan recovery (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Three years after Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda
Although the posts themselves are not necessarily incivil, they invite and incite toxic comments 
flooded with hate speech that is not only vitriolic, but can also be misogynist and racist, saying things 
like “[President Aquino and his Liberal Party] deserve to be punished by hanging...They do not have 
a heart...they only think of themselves...not of the many...they are morons.” 
The other way is when they themselves adopt incivil communication . Drawing on their expertise 
in Filipino-style snark, wit, and indignation, they fan people’s feelings of anger, resentment, and 
powerlessness towards the state of Philippine democratic politics. A favorite target of anti-Duterte 
campaigns is Mocha Uson, one of the most visible pro-Duterte key opinion leaders online. Dredging 
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Figure 7. Misogyny against Mocha Uson
up her past career as a sexy star, these campaigns can cross into misogynistic territory. They slutshame 
Mocha, harping on conservative Filipino tropes about womanhood by showing provocative images 
of her and insinuating that she is not “disente” (decent) (see Figure 7). These kinds of post attract 
equally misogynistic comments  like “Mocha Uson ang pambansang pokpok!” (Mocha Uson the 
national slut!) and “Wala ka nang hahanapin pa lahat inilabas...” (There’s nothing more to ask as 
everything has been revealed…).
In between positive branding and digital black ops is diversionary tactics. What the digital 
influencers seek to do is to change the course of a narrative or reframe an issue when these undermine 
the personal branding that the high-level strategists have designed for a political client. To do this, 
they help push for a new issue that will deflect the original issue and distract the public. This entails 
crafting disinformation materials that shift the spotlight to something positive about their client or 
to something negative about their client’s opponents. In crafting these materials, there is once again 
a strong tendency for message volatilities that similar to the ones described above.
Box Text 6. 
Anatomy of #IlibingNa: A 
Dictator Buried as a Hero
The controversy surrounding the burial of former President Ferdinand Marcos in the Heroes’ 
Cemetery had been a longstanding, if dormant, issue since 1989. It recently regained public 
prominence, however, following the order of President Rodrigo Duterte on 7 August 2016 
and a ruling from the Supreme Court on 8 November 2016, both of which paved the way 
for this burial to proceed. This was met by opposition from those in the public who said that 
Marcos did not deserve such an honor, as his dictatorial regime was characterized by, among 
other things, widespread human rights violations and government corruption. Despite this 
outcry, Marcos was in the end given a hero’s burial on 19 November 2016.
 
In the interim between Duterte’s order and the Supreme Court decision and the eventual 
burial of Marcos, we followed the Facebook and Twitter discussions around the Ilibing Na 
(which roughly translates to Allow the Burial) campaign. The online activities that we saw 
closely resembled the stages of a networked disinformation campaign. We saw how social 
media was used as an integral platform in mobilizing support for the burial campaign. We 
specifically observed how online petitions, memes, videos, and articles from websites with 
unverified content were weaponized to challenge existing narratives about Marcos, bring 
different frames on the burial issue, as well as attack critics of the burial.
 
The campaign objective of the Ilibing Na campaign seemed to be focused on getting public 
support for a hero’s burial for Ferdinand Marcos. This rode on President Duterte’s opinion 
that Marcos deserved to be buried “because he was a great president and he was a hero” and, 
moreover, that the burial would catalyze “national healing”. It similarly echoed the pleas that 
Marcos’ children released through official statements and news interviews in mainstream 
media. Former Senator Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. said, for instance, that he “hope[d] 
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that this [the SC decision would] lead the nation towards healing as [the country] endeavor[ed] 
to move the country forward”. Governor Imee Marcos, also asked her father’s critics to “let 
go” of “any anger and bitterness” and “forgive and move on”.
 
The campaign hashtags carried the sentiments above: #NoToHate, #YesToHealing, and 
of course #IlibingNa. They  clearly encapsulated the core campaign messages of healing, 
moving on, and unity. Meanwhile, the campaign used Twitter and Facebook as key audience 
touchpoints  It used social media accounts with large followers of Marcos loyalists and 
supporters to disseminate the hashtags and promote community discussions on the burial 
issue. 
 
Through our online participant observation, we witnessed not only the use of positive 
branding, digital black ops, and diversionary tactics, but also how these stoked the impassioned 
zeal of the Ilibing Na campaign’s grassroots intermediaries and ordinary supporters.
 
The campaign’s positive branding efforts included heart tugging graphics with biblical 
verses and life quotes that emphasized Filipino culture of bayanihan (or community spirit) 
and religiosity. In an attempt to move beyond discussions of reparations and justice for the 
Figure 8. #YesToHealing 
92 Ferdinand Marcos was popularly called Apo among Ilocanos.
Figure 9. Marcos versus Aquino
victims of the Marcos regime, the campaign also used captions pushed for national unity, 
peace, respect for differences, forgiveness of past mistakes, helping each other, solidarity, and 
moving on (see Figure 8).
Together with this, the campaign  used diversionary tactics to elide allegations of human rights 
violations and corruption during the term of Ferdinand Marcos. To reframe the narrative, 
social media posts highlighted Marcos’ achievements. These included memes that showcased 
the public infrastructure built during his term and that carried the hashtag #SalamatApo 
(#ThankYouApo).92 These also included posts that shifted the critical spotlight on Marcos’ 
opponents, such as this meme that playfully contrasts the achievements of Marcos to that of 
then-President Benigno Aquino III (see Figure 9).
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Figure 10. Vice President Leni Robredo’s opposition to Marcos’ hero’s burial
Finally, we also observed the campaign deploying digital black ops that targeted prominent 
critics of the Marcos burial and of the Marcoses in general. Take for example the post of a pro-
Marcos Facebook about Vice President Leni Robredo’s opposition to the burial. It reposted 
a news video clip of Robredo’s interview with the accompanying caption: “So why does Leni 
lugaw queen disapprove the burial of Marcos in the Heroes’ Cemetery? Watch and learn how 
crazy and insane Leni is” (see Figure 10). The post elicited over 16,000 reactions (likes, heart, 
angry reacts), 28,624 shares, and over 7,200 comments and video viewed over 1 million times. 
Most of the comments were incivil and vitriolic, with commentators bashing Robredo with 
different expletives. They called her called her a “bitch”, “stupid”, “insane”, told her to “shut 
up” and went as far as wishing her to die with her three daughters. It also became an avenue 
to express resentment towards the Liberal Party, to which Robredo belongs.
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Networked Disinformation Production as Hijacking 
Democratic Discussion
The tension between controlled interactivity and volatile virality of networked disinformation has led to some 
interrelated consequences for democratic public discussion. First is that because digital influencers are adept at 
identifying and bringing to the fore such issues in social media, one outcome of disinformation work has been 
to open up spaces wherein communities of discontent can express previously unheard sentiments. This has 
become especially salient in a country where ordinary people sometimes think that the mainstream news media 
neglect their most pressing concerns.93 Take for instance the growing concern that the precarious middle class 
and the working class have about drugs and criminality: from the OFWs who worry that their children back 
home might become addicts to the call center workers who are afraid for their safety when they go home at 
odd hours late at night or early in the morning to the typhoon-affected communities who are concerned about 
young people turning to drugs as part of their coping mechanisms in the midst of disaster recovery. As Nicole 
Curato says, the drug issue has been a “slow-moving” disaster that has been simmering the background for 
quite some time already but had not gained extensive media coverage until Duterte’s presidential campaign 
and subsequent victory.94
At the same time, however, this opening up of spaces for discontent has also meant that the architects of 
networked information to more easily hijack people’s sentiments and sow public divisiveness. Here it is 
important to remember that the primary intent of digital political operators is not necessarily to create vibrant 
public political discussions. They instead seek to further the goals of their political clients by innovating on 
tried-and-tested corporate and political marketing techniques, from positive branding to digital black ops. 
They also exploit their understanding of the public’s ways of engaging with political personalities and issues. 
Most perniciously, the populist style that influencers use to spark divisive discussions and fan the flames of 
discontent inevitably normalizes and amplifies toxicity in public discussions. Focused as individuals are on 
hatefully addressing each other, they are hindered from engaging in meaningful conversations.
At the same, these spaces of discontent have allowed the architects of networked disinformation to silence 
political dissent and enact historical revisionism. They use the techniques of trending and signal scrambling 
to torpedo dissenting perspectives. They also seed content that cunningly retell sordid political histories of 
presidential regimes into fairytales of a Philippine golden age. The rise of these vitriolic digital media spaces 
and information disorder online are critical developments in countries with a fragile democratic culture like 
Philippines. Despite–or perhaps because of–the country’s long if troubled liberal democratic project, there is 
currently such a weakened belief in this system that some people increasingly look to countries like Singapore 
as model of “managed democracy” or “democracy without liberalism” as a better form of governance.95
93 Cabañes and Cornelio 2017.
94 Curato 2016.
95 Chua 2017; Quah 2010.
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Chapter 5
Collective Interventions in 
the Face of Complicit Trolling
Our findings emphasize how networked disinformation is not authored by exceptional evil individuals, 
but is a collective and professionalized production. The current approach taken by opposing political 
camps in the Philippine context is to name and shame particular enemies, a digital witchhunt that 
includes cyberbullying and slutshaming known influencers and exposing anonymous influencers 
and bloggers. Seen in the light of our findings on disinformation production, the demonization 
or glorification of singular online figures fails to understand or address the roots of networked 
disinformation. As our research reveals, these roots run deep entrenched in systematized labor and 
incentive structures that have been normalized in, and even professionalized by, the creative and 
digital industries. To recognize only heroes or villains in the production of fake news leaves us blind 
to the machine behind the madness, and thus leaves democratic discourse vulnerable to its workings.
We have seen that chief disinformation architects draw from their leadership experience in the 
promotional industries when applying tried-and-tested techniques of crafting “core campaign 
messages” and developing “brand bibles” for political clients. But since the digital underground exists 
outside of traditional corporate advertising self-regulation and election campaign finance legislation, 
architects of disinformation are also able to deploy new techniques such as “signal scrambling” and 
“digital black ops” that hijack our attention and weaponize populist public sentiment. 
Knowing the architecture of networked disinformation allows us to better understand why and how 
different creative and digital workers join the digital underground and become complicit with political 
trolling. Chief architects aim to gain power and prestige by establishing themselves as pioneers of a 
new industry. Meanwhile, those from the precarious middle-class seek financial stability, often after 
experiences of rejection and exploitation from the mainstream media industry. Recognizing these 
motivations enables us to pinpoint specific vulnerabilities not only in codes of ethics and regulatory 
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practice, but also in existing labor arrangements in the creative economy in view of finding better 
ways to support precarious digital workers.
 
While we emphasize the significant impact of the structural and institutional contexts in which 
disinformation workers are embedded, we do not fully absolve these workers of their moral 
responsibility. As we have discovered from our interviews, these individuals have capacities for 
agency in the ways that they translate, execute, or even resist within the production process. The 
desire for their own political, social, and financial gain drives their complicity and collusion with 
evil infrastructures, refusal to be held accountable for the impact of their actions, and use of moral 
justifications to evade responsibility, or indeed, assign it to others. While our ethnographically 
inspired approach begins with an imperative for empathy to understand the conditions that push 
people to engage in precarious disinformation work, we assign the most culpability here to the chief 
architects who are at the top level of influence and benefit most from the architecture they have built.
This project contributes to current efforts of scholars, journalists, and civil society groups to think 
through innovative interventions and address the complex challenges of disinformation and fake news 
in national and global contexts. The work of US scholars Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan is 
at the forefront of proposing a comprehensive set of recommendations that takes into consideration 
the variety of stakeholders in information disorders.96 In the Philippine context, we observe diverse 
efforts such as 1) technology policy groups and news organizations lobbying big tech giants such 
as Google and Facebook to develop country-specific regulatory measures that address fake news 
and offensive speech,97 2) fact-checking initiatives from journalist organizations,98 3) media literacy 
modules developed by academics aimed at high school students,99 and 4) civil-society led hackathons 
that aim to design technological interventions to identifying disinformation and fake accounts. 
Building on this body of work, we propose below recommendations to key stakeholders in the 
specific national context of the Philippines, contributing to the global conversation about values and 
principles in the regulation and legislation of digital platforms and the creative economy. 
96 Wardle and Darakshan 2017.
97 The Foundation for Media Alternatives, a non-government organization, has engaged with tech giants like Google and Facebook as part of their 
work on “information and communications technologies (ICTs) for democratization and popular empowerment.” See more of their initiatives 
on internet rights and policies here: http://fma.ph/. Maria Ressa, the CEO of online news site Rappler, has attempted to lobby Facebook to take 
responsibility in combating “state-sponsored hate”, see Etter 2016.
98 Vera Files, a nonprofit independent media organization, is a signatory of the International Fact Checking Network. One of their initiatives is the 
“Vera Files Fact Check” which tracks false claims, misleading statements and flip flops of public officials and debunks it with factual information. See 
Vera Files 2018.
99 Academics, civil society, and media companies have initiated media literacy initiatives and public fora to draw awareness on digital disinformation. 
In 2016, public seminars like the Digital Youth Summit hosted by Facebook and Mano Amigo and Truth, Trust and Democracy in the Age of 
Selfies, Trolls, and Bots hosted by Rappler created intersectoral conversations among tech companies, journalists, academics, and youth leaders. 
Academics such as those from the Department of Journalism at the University of the Philippines Diliman are developing news literacy modules. The 
Communication Foundation for Asia is also spearheading an initiative with academics from De La Salle University to publish a textbook on media 
literacy for senior high school students.
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The argument this report makes is that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the complex problem 
of networked disinformation. While efforts to blacklist fake news websites, expose fake accounts, 
or vilify divisive digital influencers are well-meaning, these solutions do not address the underlying 
causes of the problem. Future research can pay greater attention to the work hierarchies and 
institutions that professionalize and incentivize 'paid troll' work. This of course means building on 
the emerging critical scholarship on the operations of power by global corporations such as Facebook 
and Google, which possess significantly concentrated and as yet unregulated power over our new 
social information infrastructures.100 Equally important, however, this involves understanding 
local contexts of disinformation production and the ways that architects of disinformation evade 
responsibility and entice other workers to join them in the digital underground. 
Encourage transparency and accountability in political marketing through industry self-
regulatory commissions101 that require disclosure of political consultancies It is a long-time 
industry “open secret” that executives in boutique agencies and even some multinational 
agencies manage political accounts. Making digital political campaigns more easily traceable 
and identifiable to corporate partners can help members of the industry become more 
accountable for, and respond to issues and questions about, the content and outcomes of their 
political campaigns.
1
2 Develop self-regulatory standards in the digital influencer industry. Attempts to 
professionalize the influencer industry following the growth of influencer companies that act 
as suppliers to digital advertising firms have primarily focused on maximizing opportunities 
for monetization potential. Undisclosed paid sponsorships102 and collaborating with 
anonymous digital influencers reveal ethical gaps and vulnerabilities in the digital influencer 
economy. Anonymity in the influencer economy enables people to elide accountability in 
their participation in political campaigns.
100 Sabeel Rahman 2017.
101 Currently, the Ad Standards Council, as a self-regulating commision in the country, review and resolve disputes on advertising content and its 
social implications. As mandated by Republic Act 7394 or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, the mission of the Ad Standards Council is to ensure 
consumer protection by reviewing advertising materials according to an industry code of ethics. While digital advertising of corporate brands is 
reviewed, the use of digital influencers for PR purposes is wholly unregulated. Political marketing consultancies are also ungoverned by industry 
commissions though occasionally guided by individual agency policy (i.e., some multinational agencies forbid taking on political clients). 
102 The Marketing Monitor 2016 published by Kantar TNS reveals that hiring digital influencers for social-media marketing is increasingly used 
throughout the ad and PR industry in Asia-Pacific, where 24% of the 2,250 marketers surveyed used paid influencers for corporate sponsorship. See 
Kantar TNS 2016.
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Recommendations to Stakeholders
What can the advertising and PR industry do?
Develop and enforce stronger codes of ethics and self-regulatory standards that reward 
and encourage transparency and accountability in digital marketing.103 Current regulatory 
boards are focused on evaluating content of traditional media advertising materials, leaving 
out recent innovations in digital marketing and public relations. Industry practices such as 
native advertising, which normalize subtle forms of deception in corporate marketing, can be 
disincentivized (i.e. through financial penalties). 
3
4 Improve conditions for creative workers, particularly for young creative professionals, who 
are vulnerable to slipping into the digital underground. For example, creative agencies can 
improve systems of mentorship and support and rewarding professionalism and ethical 
practice.
What can policymakers do?
1 Develop a Political Campaign Transparency Act that updates existing election campaign finance 
regulation to include digital campaigning. While politicians are required by the Commission 
on Elections to disclose campaign donors and their campaigns spends in traditional media 
platforms such as tv and radio, they are not yet required to disclose campaign spends in online 
platforms. The public has the right to know the full extent of campaign spending across both 
traditional and new media platforms. More comprehensive data would also allow corruption 
watchdogs to verify politicians’ total campaign spends against the stated personal income they 
are required by law to disclose as public officials.
2 This new Political Campaign Transparency Act should require politicians to disclose the 
political campaign materials for broad public discussion and reflection (and not necessarily 
for regulation or censorship). The public has the right to know the quantity and quality 
of politicians’ television and radio advertising materials but also the viral videos, trending 
hashtags, and Facebook advertisements they purchase. 
103 The Philippines reports growth in both total advertising and digital advertising revenues. Among Asia-Pacific 
countries, the Philippines records the largest increase in ad revenue in 2016 according to the report by IHS Markit 
2017. In terms of digital advertising, the Philippines revenue grew from US$291 million in 2016 to US$345 million 
according to the data from Statista 2017 (see more data on Philippine digital advertising here: https://www.statista.
com/outlook/216/123/digital-advertising/philippines#). 
3 Commission and support research on networked disinformation.
4 Support civil society groups that lobby big tech companies such as Facebook and Google to 
disclose ad buys in the context of election campaigning.
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What can civil society groups do? 
1 Work with academics and media companies to develop collective interventions to address 
networked disinformation.
2 Collaborate with technology experts to develop technological solutions, such as through 
hackathons that leverage on the insights of academics, journalists, and policymakers across 
various fields. 
3 Develop inclusive and representative advisory committees to advise on research, reportage, 
and interventions in disinformation and fake news production.
4 Link up with global institutions for a broader perspective to the problems of disinformation 
and mediatized populism. Learn from and consider the similarities and differences of the 
Philippine context with other countries and evaluate the viability and applicability of policy 
and technological interventions used abroad to the local case.
What can media companies do?
1 Ensure strong and consistent ethical standards across all media. Entertainment and commercial 
placements shoehorned into news items contribute to the trivialization of factual and public 
service content. Media organizations should explicitly distinguish promotional content in 
order to differentiate it from news content.
2 Move away from personality-based news coverage of networked disinformation, particularly 
narratives that confers villain or hero status onto individuals. Provide sense-making 
perspectives that sketch out the broader infrastructure of deception work and the policies 
that have normalized and professionalized it.
3 Promote inclusive representation and encourage diverse viewpoints. Ownership of traditional 
media companies is widely known by the public to be dominated by elite families and oligarchs. 
Media professionals thus have a greater responsibility to seek out and amplify new or unheard 
voices.
4 Foster inclusive and transparent approaches to initiatives in fact-checking. Target the 
production of disinformation and fake news across the political spectrum. 
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